

'The Real Test'

By a Staff Writer of
The Christian Science Monitor
Cambridge, Mass.

Much the most serious foreign policy mistakes of the new administration in Washington have been in execution rather than in choice of policy, McGeorge Bundy, special presidential adviser in national security, said Wednesday.

Foreign policy choices which reach the Cabinet level are pretty evenly matched, the former Harvard dean of faculty told more than 1,000 alumni, parents, and guests of the university.

"The critical question is how well you do what you set out to do," he said.

This requires, Mr. Bundy continued, finding men and women who will work creatively and imaginatively in "crazy positions" to implement the decisions.

"It is this kind of critical question which we are going to face rather more often than the questions of grand strategy," he said.

Mr. Bundy emphasized the role of the individual in the "American effort."

What measure citizens take part in carrying out the government's aim both nationally and on a worldwide basis will in the end be decisive—"the real test," he said.

Mr. Bundy agreed with another member of the panel, Robert S. Bowie, director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, that the Secretary of State must be the President's chief foreign policy adviser.

"It is my belief that the administration is moving in this direction," he said.

Many government departments are interested in foreign affairs and have a role in advising the President, but it is the Department of State which has the main line of communications, Mr. Bundy said.

The third member of the panel, Robert A. Lovett, Jr., deputy director of intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, said that in 10 years the CIA's "batting average has been good in giving warnings of coming events."

CPYRGHT

29 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
 FROM: Assistant to the Director
 SUBJECT: Luncheon with Hanson Baldwin - 29 July 1959

1. Reference your memorandum of 1 July 1959 regarding your luncheon with Hanson Baldwin of the NEW YORK TIMES on 18 June 1959 in which you state:

"Discussion was so general and unrelated to specific classified intelligence that I didn't bother to make a record. As to Col. Oregon, an additional reason for not doing so was, I admit, the known anti-party feeling between the two men which had led him to ask me to lunch rather than visiting my office with Col. Oregon."

I was disturbed by this statement because I had known Hanson Baldwin as a military writer in 1930-31 and had been closely associated with him since then, and our families have visited back and forth. In his first three or four books he had mentioned the help that I had given to him. Not only did I instruct him in military matters and where he could get military publications when I was in charge of the Army Information Service in New York City in 1931-36, but I took him on his first large-scale maneuvers in August, 1935, at Pine Camp.

2. Today I had luncheon with Baldwin and without any reference to you or your memorandum, but having just come from his interview with Mr. Dulles at which I was present, I asked him if he had any feeling as to my being present when he talked to the Director or anybody else in CIA. He replied that he had none whatsoever when it referred to me as an individual and as one of his oldest and most trusted friends, but that he had the general feeling of newspapermen that when another person is present, what they say may be monitored. However, he said, at no time has he ever expressed any such feeling regarding my presence and if anybody had indicated to me that he had in any way expressed any feeling that he would not like to have me present, he wishes I would inform such people that the statement was not factual.

3. There is no animosity between Hanson Baldwin and me.

STANLEY J. OREGAN
 Assistant to the Director

cc: DCI
 TCGI
 W/S
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